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The Role of Reputable
Auditors and Underwriters in
the Design of Bond Contracts
Yun Lou1 and Florin P. Vasvari1
Abstract
The authors empirically test the certification hypothesis by studying the roles of reputable
auditors and bank underwriters in the design of bond contracts. The certification hypoth-
esis suggests that reputable capital market intermediaries can credibly communicate inside
information to outside investors, thereby helping improve financing terms for firms that
raise external funding. Consistent with this hypothesis, the authors provide evidence that
reputable auditors and underwriters help corporate bond issuers obtain lower bond yields.
The effect of reputable auditors on the yields is greater than that of reputable underwriters
in terms of economic magnitude and significance, consistent with auditors’ multiple roles as
information intermediaries, monitors, and insurance providers. The authors also find that
the presence of reputable auditors and underwriters affects bonds’ nonpricing terms. Firms
that hire reputable auditors obtain longer term bonds, whereas those that engage reputable
underwriters can issue larger bonds. Taken together, the results suggest that reputable
auditors and underwriters have integral, but different, roles in the bond-issuing process.
Keywords
reputable auditor, reputable underwriter, bond terms, certification hypothesis
Several theoretical articles suggest that third-party information intermediaries can certify
the quality of security-issuing firms that face significant information asymmetries in capital
markets (i.e., the Certification Hypothesis). For instance, the models of DeAngelo (1981),
Beatty and Ritter (1986), Booth and Smith (1986), and Titman and Trueman (1986) exam-
ine how bank underwriters and auditors help resolve information asymmetries of issuing
firms. These theories argue that underwriters and auditors use their reputation capital as a
bonding mechanism to credibly certify the information about the future prospects of the
issuing firms, thereby helping improve firms’ financing terms when raising external financ-
ing. In this article, we empirically investigate the certification hypothesis in the primary
bond market by combining the role of auditors and underwriters. Specifically, we study the
roles of reputable auditors and bank underwriters in the design of bond contracts.
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Auditors and underwriters are important information intermediaries in the bond market,
a market that has received little attention so far despite the fact that it provides the most
significant source of external financing to U.S. firms.1 Auditors play a role in certifying
that the accounting information provided in the bond prospectuses by issuing firms is accu-
rate and prepared in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. In addi-
tion to the certification function, auditors have a monitoring role, which they fulfill by
reporting potential errors in financial statements and violations of covenants set in bond
contracts. Auditors also bear legal liability for accounting irregularities that occur in the
reports of the firms they audit and, under certain conditions, provide bond investors with a
means to indemnify their losses (e.g., Dye, 1993; Mansi, Maxwell, & Miller, 2004).2 These
monitoring and insurance roles complement auditors’ certification role and potentially
make auditors more relevant information intermediaries to bondholders than underwriters.
Although underwriters certify information about the future prospects of issuing firms and
use their extensive distribution networks and selling expertise to help issuing firms place
bond securities, their liability is limited to situations where negligence is proven. Hence,
underwriters typically do not provide insurance against investment losses. Furthermore,
they have a limited monitoring role after a bond is issued.3
High-quality bond issuers are likely to signal their type by seeking certification from
reputable auditors and underwriters. Auditors and underwriters develop reputation capital
by repeatedly entering into the market and providing credible information about the issuing
firms. As a result, the value of their reputation capital likely exceeds even the largest possi-
ble one-time gain that could be obtained from certifying falsely. Rational investors should
understand these incentives and thus provide capital under more favorable terms to the
firms certified by intermediaries with reputation capital at stake.
To test these arguments in the bond market, we first construct reputation proxies for
auditors and underwriters. We designate an auditor as a reputable auditor if its market
share based on the clients’ sales is the largest in the industry and outpaces the rest of audi-
tors by at least 10% (Dunn & Mayhew, 2004; Palmrose, 1986). We define reputable audi-
tors at the industry level because the prior literature shows that industry expertise possessed
by auditors can affect managers’ earnings management behavior and reduce information
asymmetry between firms and investors (e.g., Almutairi, Dunn, & Skantz, 2009; Balsam,
Krishnan, & Yang, 2003). As most issuers in the bond market hire large auditors, our focus
is only on companies audited by the big four/five auditors. We define an underwriter as
reputable if its market share, as captured by the bond volume advised in the whole bond
market, persistently ranks among the top five underwriters in the past 3 years.
Consistent with the certification hypothesis, we find that hiring reputable auditors
reduces bond issuance yields by 35 basis points, which is both statistically and economi-
cally significant. This decrease in bond yields translates into annual interest savings of
US$65,450 for the average bond issue in our sample. Reputable underwriters also help
issuers lower the yields by 19 basis points, a significantly weaker effect than that of reputa-
ble auditors. The greater impact of hiring reputable auditors is consistent with auditors’
multiple roles as information intermediaries, monitors, and insurance providers.
We further examine whether reputable auditors and underwriters provide value with
respect to nonpricing terms of bond contracts, such as bond maturity and size.4 Debt matu-
rity plays an important role in reducing agency costs associated with asset substitution and
improving the efficiency of monitoring by lenders (Leland & Toft, 1996; Stulz, 2000).
Short bond maturities may reduce agency costs by subjecting managers to more frequent
monitoring by investors and rating agencies (e.g., Datta, Iskandar-Datta, & Raman, 2005).
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However, hiring a reputable auditor may provide an alternative monitoring mechanism to
reduce these costs because reputable auditors are incentivized to monitor issuing firms’
financial reporting continuously to maintain their reputation in the industry. As a result,
issuing firms with reputable auditors may potentially borrow from bondholders for a longer
period compared with those with ordinary auditors. Consistent with our conjecture, we find
evidence that hiring reputable auditors, on average, lengthens bond maturities by 2.54
years, a statistically significant effect. We do not find a strong substitution effect between
the presence of reputable underwriters and bond maturity. This could be explained by the
nature of the underwriters’ job. Underwriters are responsible for marketing and selling
bonds; however, once the bonds are issued, they do not have any monitoring role.
Finally, we examine the impact of reputable auditors and underwriters on bond size,
which is an indicator of the issuing firm’s repayment ability. If an issuing firm has a higher
level of tangible assets and/or is able to generate larger future cash flows, it can borrow more
debt. To the extent that reputable auditors and underwriters can certify the accuracy of tangi-
ble assets and the ability to generate cash flows to pay the debt back, issuing firms with repu-
table auditors and underwriters may be able to borrow a larger amount than those with
ordinary auditors and underwriters. In addition to the certification effect, the size of a bond
issue also depends on underwriters’ marketing and selling abilities. Reputable underwriters
have extensive distributional networks and superior selling power, which allow them to place
larger bond issues. Consistent with these arguments, we find evidence that reputable under-
writers have a strong positive effect on the size of the bond. Specifically, hiring reputable
underwriters increases the actual offering amount by 13.73% relative to the average offering
amount in our sample. We do not find a similar result for reputable auditors, suggesting that
these information intermediaries play a different role in the bond-issuing process.
Our article makes two significant contributions to existing knowledge on the value of
auditors and underwriters in the bond market. First, we bridge two disconnected strands of
literature by testing the certification hypothesis simultaneously for reputable auditors and
underwriters in the bond market. Although Mansi et al. (2004) and Ahmed, Rasmussen,
and Tse (2008) have explored the role of auditors in reducing bondholder–shareholder con-
flicts, reputable underwriters were not considered as additional intermediaries in the analy-
sis. By combining the certification role of reputable auditors with that of reputable
underwriters, we highlight different roles played by these important capital market interme-
diaries with respect to the structuring of public debt financing.
Second, our article contributes to the growing body of literature that examines more
detailed aspects of debt contracts (e.g., Brockman, Martin, & Unlu, 2010; Qian & Strahan,
2007). Previous studies in the bond or syndicated loan market attempt to understand the
drivers of a single, contractual dimension (typically the bond yield or the loan spread).5 We
provide unique evidence on the effects of reputable auditors and underwriters on the bond
maturity and size. As a result, this study sheds light on the role of information intermedi-
aries with reputation capital on the nonpricing terms of bond contracts and examines the
joint role of auditors and underwriters in a richer setting than other articles that focused on
the equity market.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows: Section titled ‘‘Related Literature and
Hypotheses’’ provides a discussion of related literature and formalizes our hypotheses, sec-
tion titled ‘‘Data and Research Design’’ describes empirical strategies and data and is fol-
lowed by the ‘‘Results’’ section that presents the main results, section titled ‘‘Sensitivity
Analyses and Additional Tests’’ offers some robustness checks, and the final section titled
‘‘Conclusion’’ concludes the article.
22 Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance
Related Literature and Hypotheses
The certification hypothesis is derived from the literature on the use of reputation capital to
guarantee product quality (Klein & Leffler, 1981). As an extension to this theoretical litera-
ture, DeAngelo (1981) shows that when incumbent auditors earn client-specific quasi rents,
auditors with a greater number of clients have more to lose by failing to report a discovered
breach in a client’s accounting system. The higher the value placed by large auditors on
their reputation, the better is the quality of their audits. Consistent with this argument, the
model of Titman and Trueman (1986) finds that firms that hire high-quality auditors
receive greater valuations when securities are issued. Similarly, Booth and Smith (1986)
model underwriter reputation as a bonding mechanism to solve the information problems
between issuing firms and investors, and find that underwriter reputation is formed either
through a premium price charged for quality assurance or the objective of maintaining
long-term profits through repeated entries into the market. The models of Chemmanur and
Fulghieri (1994) or Beatty and Ritter (1986) provide similar arguments by showing that
investment banks’ reputations are achieved by adopting stringent evaluation standards.
Taken together, these theories imply that reputation capital can provide capital market
intermediaries such as auditors and underwriters with incentives to commit to honest infor-
mation production on the firms they serve.
By providing more accurate information, these information intermediaries allow outside
investors to make more precise estimates of firm values and better investment decisions.
As intermediaries with reputation capital at stake can be adversely and materially affected
if their information certification proves false, investors may accept less protection on the
securities issued by firms hiring these intermediaries. Therefore, we hypothesize that both
auditors and underwriters with reputation concerns play certification roles that help reduce
issuers’ cost of debt or relax the nonpricing terms of their debt contracts.
Empirical studies have examined the certification roles of auditors and underwriters sep-
arately. Pittman and Fortin (2004) and Mansi et al. (2004) find that the cost of debt is
lower for firms with larger auditors. Ahmed et al. (2008) show that industry audit special-
ists help firms reduce the cost of capital, both equity and debt. Empirical evidence in
finance, however, finds that reputable underwriters obtain lower yields and charge higher
fees (e.g., Fang, 2005). However, auditors and underwriters have integral, but different,
roles in the bond-issuing process, and ignoring either in empirical analyses can lead to
imprecise inferences of their respective contributions.
The theoretical model developed by Balvers, McDonald, and Miller (1988) provides gui-
dance for our empirical analysis of auditors and underwriters in the bond market. The
model shows that investment banks with reputation concerns are more likely to select high-
reputation auditors as a signal of their own quality, and together, they reduce the underpri-
cing of initial public offerings of equity issues. The model also predicts that highly reputa-
ble auditors and underwriters have divergent effects on underpricing—as the reputation
effect of one intermediary increases, the effect of the other diminishes. We expect these
findings to apply to the bond market, as well, for several reasons. First, auditors provide
assurance that firms’ financial statements are prepared in accordance with Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles, whereas underwriters assist firms in documenting, market-
ing, and selling securities. Hence, the information content of both certification roles can
differ, with auditors verifying accounting information before and after a bond is issued, and
underwriters affirming to general future prospects about bond issuers.
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Second, auditors are at high risk for litigation and play an additional insurance role by
indemnifying investors against disclosures of false accounting information. In recent years,
the litigation against auditors has grown dramatically, both in frequency and cost.6 The pas-
sage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act further expanded the legal responsibility of auditors, requir-
ing them to report on the adequacy of client firms’ internal control over financial reporting.
In addition, auditors—especially those with reputation capital at stake—incur indirect costs
from litigation, such as loss of reputation capital. If investors recognize the relatively high
litigation costs associated with reputable auditors in the event of failure to detect account-
ing irregularities, they may place more value on the certification role of reputable auditors
than on that of reputable underwriters. Therefore, given the differences in the certified
information content and exposed litigation costs that exist between auditors and underwri-
ters, we expect reputable auditors to play a stronger role in reducing the cost of debt than
reputable underwriters.
Although the theoretical predictions about the certification effect on the credit spreads
are clear, inferences about certification’s role on the negotiated nonpricing bond terms are
less straightforward. Debt maturity is one of the main nonpricing terms of a bond contract
and is well regarded as an ex-post monitoring device. For example, Leland and Toft (1996)
argue that short-term debt reduces or even eliminates the agency costs associated with asset
substitution. Also, Stulz (2000) illustrates that short-term debt provides creditors with an
extremely powerful tool to monitor the borrowing firm’s management. Managers with
higher stock ownership choose a larger proportion of short-maturity debt, thereby commit-
ting to more frequent monitoring (Datta et al., 2005). Auditors, too, play a role in monitor-
ing issuing firms’ financial reporting systems. In particular, auditors with a reputation
concern have stronger incentives to assure the quality of financial reporting throughout the
period when debt is outstanding. Given reputable auditors’ incentives to facilitate ex-post
monitoring of issuers, one could expect either a substitution or a complementary effect
between the presence of reputable auditors and the negotiation of a shorter debt maturity.
In contrast, the underwriters’ main role is to assist borrowers only at issuance; they have
no responsibility to monitor borrowers after issuance. As a result, we do not expect an asso-
ciation between the presence of reputable underwriters and bond maturity.
Another important nonpricing term of a bond contract is the size of the bond issue. The
size is associated with default risk—the larger the bond, the greater the pressure on its
issuer’s repayment ability. To the extent that reputable auditors and underwriters reduce the
inherent uncertainty associated with the measurement of default risk at issuance, one would
expect an increase in the bond sizes of issuers with these types of intermediaries. The size
of a bond issue is also a function of the distributional networks and selling abilities of the
underwriter. Reputable underwriters have extensive distributional channels, strong relation-
ships with institutional and individual investors as well as superior marketing and selling
abilities, all of which facilitate the issuance of larger amounts of debt (Fang, 2005). Taking
this into account, we expect that reputable underwriters potentially play a more important
role in increasing the size of the bonds issued when compared with reputable auditors.
Data and Research Design
Proxies of Reputable Auditors and Underwriters
To capture the reputation concerns of auditors and underwriters, we measure their reputa-
tion capital based on the magnitude of their respective market share. This is consistent with
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the theoretical argument that if an information intermediary, such as an auditor or under-
writer, engages in quality cutting, this information disseminates faster if the intermediary
has a large market share (e.g., Klein & Leffler, 1981). Furthermore, with a large market
share, the expected long-term fee premium from information intermediaries’ reputation is
also likely to exceed the short-term benefits that could be obtained by misinforming inves-
tors. Therefore, the market share reflects the income stream at stake, and larger auditors or
underwriters have more to lose from a damaged reputation.
We measure a reputable auditor’s market share using the total sales audited by an audi-
tor within an industry (Dunn & Mayhew, 2004; Palmrose, 1986). We focus on the certifica-
tion role of auditors specializing in a particular industry because they are associated with
high-quality audits (Craswell, Francis, & Taylor, 1995; Krishnan, 2003). Becoming an
industry specialist requires a significant investment in training and time to establish a solid
reputation. Also, industry audit specialists have a large market share, as their expertise is
recognized and they are sought out within the industry. As a result, consistent with
DeAngelo’s (1981) argument, they have more to lose if they fail to detect frauds in their
clients’ audits.
We define an industry as all firms with the same two-digit primary Standard Industry
Classification (SIC) code in the Compustat universe.7 We designate an auditor as a reputa-
ble auditor if its market share is the largest in the industry and outpaces the rest of auditors
by at least 10%. The 10% cutoff supports our inferences on the qualitative differences in
auditors’ reputations in a particular industry. In checking for robustness, we also confirm
that using a 15% or 5% cutoff does not alter the robustness of our results. Furthermore, we
validate this measure by investigating the association between the presence of industry
audit specialists and the accounting and governance risks of the firms that hire them.8
Although auditors provide services for the universe of public firms and are pressed to dif-
ferentiate themselves through industry specialization, underwriters in the debt market, which
is not as competitive as the equity market, tend to focus on multiple segments. For instance,
Yasuda (2005) documents that underwriters’ bank relationships with borrowers have a posi-
tive and significant impact on their bond underwriting business.9 Therefore, we use the
market share based on the underwriter’s volume in the whole bond market to identify reputa-
ble underwriters. We define an underwriter as reputable if its market share persistently ranks
among the top five underwriters in the past 3 years.10 The intuition behind this measure is
that an underwriter with a large market share will not imperil its reputation for the sake of
short-term profits. Underwriters with a large market share extract economic rents on reputa-
tion from their clients (Fang, 2005). Moreover, they are repeat players, and the poor perfor-
mance of a bond not only damages their reputation in the bond market but could also affect
their businesses in other areas, such as bank lending, equity underwritings, or Mergers &
Acquisitions Advisory services. In robustness checks (see section titled ‘‘Sensitivity Analyses
and Additional Tests’’), we also present results using the top eight underwriters and classify-
ing reputable underwriters based on the number of bonds they place.
Regression Specifications
This section presents the regression specifications concerning the effects of reputable audi-
tors and underwriters on the bond terms. To examine the certification roles of reputable
auditors and underwriters on bonds’ spreads, we estimate the following regression (we
present the computation of all variables in Appendix A):
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Credit Spread5a1bReputable Auditor1r Reputable Underwriter
1u Interaction Term1pFirmControls1yBond Controls
1s Industry  and Year  Fixed Effects1e:
ð1Þ
The dependent variable Credit Spread represents the risk premium that investors require
to hold the issuer’s bond, taking into consideration the effect of business cycles. Credit
Spread is a better proxy for the cost of debt than interest expense used by prior studies for
several reasons. First, the interest expense field pools together the cost of debt with differ-
ent types of lenders, different maturities, and security features. Banks rely less on auditors
than bondholders because they have access to private information that is not reflected in
public financial statements. Even within public debt, debt securities are not homogeneous,
and they cannot be pooled easily unless their distinctive features are controlled for in the
empirical tests. Second, the interest expense field from Compustat includes other items that
are irrelevant to the cost of debt, such as amortization of expenses associated with debt
issuance.11 Third, the interest expense is not adjusted for treasuries; thus, the measure
moves with the interest rate environment or macroeconomic conditions, which may create
spurious correlations.
Reputable Auditor and Reputable Underwriter are indicator variables equal to ‘‘1,’’ if an
issue is certified by reputable auditors or reputable underwriters, and ‘‘0’’ otherwise. We also
include an interaction term, Reputable Auditor and Reputable Underwriter to examine whether
the effects of reputable auditors and underwriters on credit spreads vary with each other.
We control for firm-specific variables to account for cross-sectional differences in credit
spreads beyond the effect of hiring reputable auditors and underwriters. We include auditor
tenure (Tenure) as it has been shown to be negatively related to credit spreads because of
its role in reducing the information asymmetry between the issuer and the investors (Mansi
et al., 2004). Firm size and leverage are proxies for the issuer’s financing risk. We measure
them as the natural log of total assets of the issuer (Firm Size) and the ratio of long-term
debt to total assets (Leverage), respectively. To control for the issuer’s risk of repaying the
debt and the coupons, we also include the asset tangibility computed as net property plant
and equipment scaled by total assets (Tangibility) and the return on assets (ROA) in the
regression.
Furthermore, we control for bond variables in our analysis. Although put options or
sinking fund features add safety to bond issues and are expected to be negatively related to
credit spreads, call options or subordinated clauses put bondholders at a disadvantage and,
therefore, are priced in the risk premium. We include maturity and bond size in the regres-
sion of credit spreads, as the potential losses to bond investors increase in the time horizons
of repayments and the offering amounts. Furthermore, restrictive covenants mitigate the
wealth transfer from bondholders to shareholders. Investors demand more covenants if the
risk of wealth expropriation or asset substitution is more severe. Hence, we use the number
of covenants to account for the riskiness of bond issues due to a higher agency cost of
debt.
Credit-rating agencies, as information intermediaries, also provide independent assess-
ments of the issuer’s credit risk. As they have access to the issuer’s private information,
their opinions are valued by bondholders. Therefore, we include credit-rating information
as a control in our analysis of credit spread. We designate an indicator variable Speculative
Grade equal to ‘‘1’’ to the issues rated below a BBB rating by Moody’s or Standard &
Poor’s (S&P’s), and ‘‘0’’ otherwise.
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We then examine the relationship between reputable auditors and underwriters and bond
maturities, controlling for the risk of bonds as well as other factors known to influence
bond maturities. The specification of the maturity regression is as follows:
Maturity5a1bReputable Auditor1r Reputable Underwriter
1u Interaction Term1pFirmControls1yBond Controls
1s Industry  and Year  Fixed Effects1e:
ð2Þ
Maturity is measured as the maturity date of a bond issue minus its offering date in
years. In this test, we also include Credit Spread as an additional control variable because
it reflects the inherent risk associated with bond issues. Furthermore, because credit spreads
already incorporate the credit risk assessments provided by credit-rating agencies, we do
not include the credit-rating information in this regression. The remaining control variables
are similar to the ones we use in the Credit Spread regression.
Finally, to explore the effects of reputable auditors and underwriters on bond sizes, we
use a similar regression specification as the regression of bond maturity:
Bond Size5 a1bReputable Auditor1r Reputable Underwriter
1u InteractionTerm1pFirmControls1yBond Controls
1s Industry  and Year  Fixed Effects1e:
ð3Þ
To account for the possibility that there are shifts in debt financing over time caused by
changes in general capital market conditions, we include year-fixed effects in all bond
terms regressions. Furthermore, we also add fixed effects at the industry level, given that
the cost of debt and other bond terms vary with the industry membership (e.g., Jorion, Shi,
& Zhang, 2009). We account for the correlation of error terms across observations that
belong to the same issuing firm by calculating robust standard errors that allow for cluster-
ing at the firm level.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
We use two data sources for our main analysis: the Compustat database and the Mergent
Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD). The former provides us information to measure
the reputation of auditors and other firm-level variables, whereas the latter enables us to
identify our dependent variables, the reputation of underwriters, and other bond-specific
characteristics that we use as controls in our empirical tests. Information on corporate bond
issues received reasonable coverage in 1995; therefore, we focus our analysis from 1995 to
2006.
To calculate the market shares of auditors in each industry, we begin with a sample of
firm-year observations that have sales information in the Compustat database. Based on
these market shares, we construct the reputable auditor measure for each of the years in our
sample.12 We then manually match this Compustat sample with the Mergent FISD bond
data (based on company names, industry, and location), excluding observations without
information on firm-level control variables (size, leverage, etc.). We do not consider corpo-
rate bonds that are convertible, privately placed, issued in foreign currencies, or do not
have fixed coupon payments. These filters allow us to select a more homogeneous group of
bond securities that facilitates better cross-sectional comparisons. As the majority of
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auditors hired by firms issuing bonds are Big Auditors (98% in our matched sample), we
further eliminate firms not audited by Big Auditors and focus on the variation of reputation
concerns that pertains to industry expertise.
Finally, we exclude issues without underwriting information. As a result, our final
sample consists of 9,517 bond issue-level observations. We include financial institutions in
our analysis because prior literature (e.g., Craswell et al., 1995) argues that the demand for
auditor industry specialization is increasing in the complexity of auditing tasks. Financial
institutions have complicated contracts for financial instruments and derivatives, requiring
auditors with sophisticated financial knowledge to prepare the audits.
We present the details of our sample selection process in Panel A of Table 1. As firms
often issue multiple bonds over the sample period or during a year, we report both firm-
level and issue-level distributions by year in Panel B of Table 1. Our final sample com-
prises 1,771 firm-year observations and 9,517 bond issue-year observations. Panel A of
Table 2 presents summary statistics for all variables used in our tests grouped depending
Table 1. Sample Selection and Distribution
Panel A: Sample selection
Description Observations
Reputable auditor sample 60,337
Eliminate observations without information on firm-level
control variables
(790)
Eliminate observations without bond information (49,143)
Eliminate firms audited by non Big Auditors (128)
Eliminate observations without underwriter information (759)
Final sample 9,517
Panel B: Sample distribution by year
Year Firm-level observations Bond issue-level observations
1995 54 239
1996 82 361
1997 106 482
1998 202 554
1999 126 617
2000 64 439
2001 181 759
2002 62 153
2003 330 2,239
2004 196 1,551
2005 199 1,330
2006 169 793
Total 1,771 9,517
Note: Panel A of Table 1 presents the observation selection process. We first construct a sample based on the
identification of reputable auditors. We then delete observations without information on firm-level control vari-
ables. We merge the resulting sample with the Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database to get bond issue-level
variables. As we only focus on firms audited by Big Auditors, we eliminate firms audited by non Big Auditors.
Finally, we delete observations that do not have underwriter information. Panel B looks at the distribution of the
firm-level and bond issue-level observations by year. Our sample is over the period from 1995 to 2006.
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on whether they capture firm or bond characteristics. On average, 27% of bond issues in
our sample are certified by reputable auditors. The standard deviation of the reputable audi-
tor measure Reputable Auditor is 0.45. The average auditor–client relationship is about 6
years (Tenure). Also, the average leverage ratio is 43%, suggesting that the firms in our
sample rely more on debt financing than the average Compustat firm (25%). Firms in our
sample are relatively large, consistent with the fact that large firms frequently access the
corporate bond market.
The average value of the indicator variable Reputable Underwriter is 0.09, implying that
9% of bond issues are placed by reputable underwriters. Credit Spread, measured as the
difference between a bond issue’s offering yield and the yield of a matching treasury issue,
is the pricing term of a bond and captures the direct cost of borrowing. The match with
treasury bills’ yields integrates the influence of business cycles on the corporate bond
market. The average credit spread of bonds in our sample is about 130 basis points, with a
standard deviation of about 146 basis points. The mean maturity of bonds is approximately
9.01 years, consistent with the fact that bonds are usually issued with long terms. Bond
Size is calculated as the logarithm of an issue’s offering amount, and its mean value is
9.83, with a standard deviation of 2.14. We assign numeric values to the credit ratings of
Moody’s or S&P’s.13 The variable Credit Rating is an increasing function of the riskiness
of a bond issue. The average firm in our sample receives a rating level of 6.75, well within
the investment grade range. We also report the Spearman correlations among all the vari-
ables in Panel B of Table 2.
Results
Univariate Evidence
We begin with univariate tests to show preliminary evidence for the effects of reputable
auditors and underwriters on bonds’ pricing and nonpricing terms. In Panel A of Table 3,
we present the results of t tests of mean differences in the credit spreads, maturities, and
bond sizes between issues with reputable auditors and those without. As shown in Panel A,
the mean credit spread for the bonds issued with reputable auditors is significantly lower
than that for the bonds without reputable auditors at the 1% level, suggesting that reputable
auditors play a role in reducing the cost of borrowing. Furthermore, we find that maturities
are significantly longer for issues with reputable auditors at the 1% level too, consistent
with the argument that reputable auditors substitute for the role of short-term debt as a
monitoring device. The size of a bond is statistically larger for issues certified by reputable
auditors, seemingly supporting the hypothesis that reputable auditors reduce the information
risk in bond issues and, in turn, bondholders are willing to provide more debt capital.
Panel B of Table 3 presents univariate results for firms hiring reputable underwriters.
Although the role of reputable underwriters on nonpricing terms is consistent with its certi-
fication role in reducing the agency’s cost of debt, its effect on the credit spreads seems to
be at odds. Issues with reputable underwriters are associated with larger credit spreads. As
this univariate test does not control for other correlated variables that explain credit
spreads, we rely on multivariate regression specifications to make proper inferences about
the role of reputable underwriters on the spreads. However, the effect of hiring reputable
underwriters on bond maturity and size is consistent with the arguments that they are reduc-
ing information asymmetries and have access to extensive distribution channels. Firms that
Lou and Vasvari 29
T
a
b
le
2
.
Su
m
m
ar
y
St
at
is
ti
cs
P
an
el
A
:
D
es
cr
ip
ti
ve
st
at
is
ti
cs
D
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
o
b
se
rv
at
io
n
M
SD
2
5
th
5
0
th
7
5
th
Fi
rm
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
R
ep
ut
ab
le
A
ud
ito
r
9
,5
1
7
0
.2
7
0
.4
5
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
1
.0
0
Te
nu
re
9
,5
1
7
6
.1
2
3
.2
8
3
.0
0
6
.0
0
9
.0
0
Le
ve
ra
ge
9
,5
1
7
0
.4
3
0
.1
7
0
.3
2
0
.4
5
0
.5
3
Ta
ng
ib
ili
ty
9
,5
1
7
2
2
.7
5
%
2
3
.7
6
%
8
.1
8
%
1
3
.1
7
%
3
1
.0
6
%
R
O
A
9
,5
1
7
9
.0
5
%
4
.8
5
%
6
.5
3
%
8
.1
8
%
9
.9
0
%
Fi
rm
Si
ze
9
,5
1
7
1
0
.4
8
1
.7
9
9
.3
7
1
0
.2
7
1
2
.0
3
B
o
n
d
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
R
ep
ut
ab
le
U
nd
er
w
ri
te
r
9
,5
1
7
0
.0
9
0
.2
8
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
C
re
di
t
Sp
re
ad
9
,5
1
7
1
.3
0
1
.4
6
0
.4
7
0
.8
6
1
.7
1
C
re
di
t
R
at
in
g
9
,5
1
7
6
.7
1
4
.7
6
5
.0
0
6
.0
0
7
.0
0
M
at
ur
ity
(y
ea
rs
)
9
,5
1
7
9
.0
1
8
.0
4
4
.0
0
7
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
O
ff
er
in
g
A
m
ou
nt
($
)
9
,5
1
7
1
8
7
,4
2
1
2
,0
6
1
,6
9
6
3
,4
6
7
1
3
,2
2
9
1
5
0
,0
0
0
B
on
d
Si
ze
9
,5
1
7
9
.8
3
2
.1
4
8
.1
5
9
.4
9
1
1
.9
2
C
al
la
bl
e
9
,5
1
7
0
.4
5
0
.5
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
1
.0
0
Pu
ta
bl
e
9
,5
1
7
0
.0
1
0
.0
8
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
Si
nk
in
g
Fu
nd
9
,5
1
7
0
.0
0
0
.0
6
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
Su
bo
rd
in
at
ed
9
,5
1
7
0
.0
1
0
.1
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
N
o.
of
C
ov
en
an
ts
9
,5
1
7
1
.6
4
3
.5
4
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
P
an
el
B
:
C
o
rr
el
at
io
n
s
C
re
di
t
Sp
re
ad
M
at
ur
ity
B
on
d
Si
ze
C
re
di
t
R
at
in
g
R
ep
ut
ab
le
A
ud
ito
r
R
ep
ut
ab
le
U
nd
er
w
ri
te
r
Te
nu
re
Le
ve
ra
ge
Ta
ng
ib
ili
ty
R
O
A
Fi
rm
Si
ze
C
al
la
bl
e
Pu
ta
bl
e
Si
nk
in
g
Fu
nd
Su
bo
rd
in
at
ed
M
at
ur
ity
.2
0
*
*
*
B
on
d
Si
ze
.3
8
*
*
*
.1
7
*
*
*
C
re
di
t
R
at
in
g
.5
8
*
*
*
2
.0
6
*
*
*
.3
2
*
*
*
R
ep
ut
ab
le
A
ud
ito
r
2
.0
6
*
*
*
.2
5
*
*
*
.1
5
*
*
*
2
.2
3
*
*
*
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
30
T
a
b
le
2
.
(c
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
)
P
an
el
B
:
C
o
rr
el
at
io
n
s
C
re
di
t
Sp
re
ad
M
at
ur
ity
B
on
d
Si
ze
C
re
di
t
R
at
in
g
R
ep
ut
ab
le
A
ud
ito
r
R
ep
ut
ab
le
U
nd
er
w
ri
te
r
Te
nu
re
Le
ve
ra
ge
Ta
ng
ib
ili
ty
R
O
A
Fi
rm
Si
ze
C
al
la
bl
e
Pu
ta
bl
e
Si
nk
in
g
Fu
nd
Su
bo
rd
in
at
ed
R
ep
ut
ab
le
U
nd
er
w
ri
te
r
.1
0
*
*
*
.1
1
*
*
*
.3
2
*
*
*
.1
1
*
*
*
.1
1
*
*
*
Te
nu
re
.0
6
*
*
*
.0
1
2
.0
7
*
*
*
2
.1
1
*
*
*
.0
3
*
*
*
2
.0
1
Le
ve
ra
ge
.1
3
*
*
*
2
.1
6
*
*
*
2
.3
0
*
*
*
.0
9
*
*
*
2
.3
3
*
*
*
2
.1
3
*
*
*
.0
1
Ta
ng
ib
ili
ty
.2
2
*
*
*
.1
6
*
*
*
.3
4
*
*
*
.2
2
*
*
*
.0
3
*
*
*
.1
4
*
*
*
2
.0
4
*
*
*
2
.3
2
*
*
*
R
O
A
.1
0
*
*
*
.0
7
*
*
*
.3
3
*
*
*
.2
0
*
*
*
2
.0
6
*
*
*
.1
3
*
*
*
2
.1
8
*
*
*
2
.3
3
*
*
*
.6
2
*
*
*
Fi
rm
Si
ze
2
.1
5
*
*
*
2
.1
2
*
*
*
2
.2
9
*
*
*
2
.4
2
*
*
*
.0
7
*
*
*
2
.1
8
*
*
*
.4
2
*
*
*
.1
7
*
*
*
2
.3
6
*
*
*
2
.4
2
*
*
*
C
al
la
bl
e
.3
7
*
*
*
.6
2
*
*
*
.2
7
*
*
*
.1
6
*
*
*
.1
4
*
*
*
.1
5
*
*
*
.1
5
*
*
*
2
.0
6
*
*
*
.1
9
*
*
*
.1
0
*
*
*
2
.1
5
*
*
*
Pu
ta
bl
e
2
.0
5
*
*
*
.0
9
*
*
*
.0
2
*
*
*
.0
0
2
.0
1
.0
1
2
.0
7
*
*
*
2
.0
2
*
*
.0
5
*
*
*
.0
7
*
*
*
2
.0
5
*
*
*
2
.0
4
*
*
*
Si
nk
in
g
Fu
nd
2
.0
1
.0
5
*
*
*
.0
5
*
*
*
2
.0
1
.0
3
*
*
*
2
.0
1
2
.0
2
*
*
2
.0
2
*
*
.0
7
*
*
*
2
.0
0
2
.0
4
*
*
*
.0
6
*
*
*
2
.0
0
Su
bo
rd
in
at
ed
2
.0
6
*
*
*
.0
3
*
*
*
2
.0
1
2
.0
7
*
*
*
.0
7
*
*
*
2
.0
1
*
2
.0
9
*
*
*
2
.1
1
*
*
*
.1
4
*
*
*
.0
2
*
*
2
.0
4
*
*
*
2
.0
1
*
2
.0
1
.3
9
*
*
*
N
o.
of
C
ov
en
an
ts
.3
8
*
*
*
.2
4
*
*
*
.6
6
*
*
*
.4
6
*
*
*
.1
5
*
*
*
.3
1
*
*
*
2
.1
4
*
*
*
2
.2
3
*
*
*
.3
7
*
*
*
.3
7
*
*
*
2
.5
3
*
*
*
.3
7
*
*
*
.0
1
.0
2
*
*
2
.0
2
*
*
N
o
te
:
R
O
A
=
re
tu
rn
o
n
as
se
ts
.
T
h
is
p
an
el
re
p
o
rt
s
th
e
p
ai
r-
w
is
e
Sp
ea
rm
an
co
rr
el
at
io
n
s
o
f
va
ri
ab
le
s
u
se
d
in
th
e
an
al
ys
es
.
*,
**
,
**
*
ar
e
1
0
%
,
5
%
,
an
d
1
%
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
ce
le
ve
ls
,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
31
hire reputable underwriters obtain bonds with a significantly longer term at the 1% level
and can issue larger bonds also at the 1% level.
Multivariate Evidence
Table 4 reports the results regarding the effects of reputable auditors and underwriters on
credit spreads, maturities, and bond sizes. In Models 1, 3, and 5, we estimate the effects of
reputable auditors and underwriters on bond terms in a reduced form that only includes
firm, industry, and year-fixed effects (e.g., Qian & Strahan, 2007). This mitigates the con-
cern that bond features such as offering yield or maturity likely are simultaneously deter-
mined and therefore might produce biased estimates when included as explanatory
variables. Models 2, 4, and 6 correspond to the full regression specifications.
Models 1 and 2 show the results of the credit spread regression. In Model 1, without
controlling for bond characteristics, the effect of reputable auditors is negative and statisti-
cally significant at the 10% level. Model 2 displays the results for the full regression of
credit spread as specified in the previous section. Consistent with the certification hypoth-
esis, the coefficient estimates on both reputable auditors and reputable underwriters are
negative and statistically significant at the 1% and 10% level, respectively. These results
can be interpreted as evidence that intermediaries with reputation concerns help issuers
obtain lower costs of debt. Furthermore, in terms of economic magnitude, reputable audi-
tors on average reduce credit spreads by 35 basis points, whereas reputable underwriters
receive only a 19 basis points decrease in spreads. This effect suggests that for the average
bond issued by a firm hiring reputable auditors and underwriters, the cost of debt is lower
by US$65,597 and US$35,609, respectively.
Table 3. Univariate Tests
Panel A: Reputable versus ordinary auditor
M1 M0 Difference in M t statistic
Credit Spread 1.18 1.34 20.16*** 24.72
Maturity 11.94 7.91 4.03*** 22.32
Bond Size 10.38 9.62 0.76*** 15.70
Panel B: Reputable versus ordinary underwriters
M1 M0 Difference in M t statistic
Credit Spread 1.77 1.25 0.52*** 10.02
Maturity 12.06 8.71 3.35*** 11.60
Bond Size 12.16 9.60 2.56*** 35.33
Note: This table presents the results for univariate tests of reputable auditors and reputable underwriters. In Panel
A, we compare the differences in bond terms between firms hiring reputable auditors and those hiring ordinary
auditors. In Panel B, we compare the differences in bond terms between firms hiring reputable underwriters and
those hiring ordinary underwriters. M1 is the average Credit Spread/Maturity/Bond Size for firms hiring reputable
auditors or underwriters, whereas M0 is the average Credit Spread/Maturity/Bond Size for firms hiring ordinary audi-
tors or underwriters. Difference in M calculates the differences in bond terms between firms hiring reputable audi-
tors/underwriters and those hiring ordinary auditors/underwriters. t statistics are from one-tailed t tests.
*,**, *** are 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.
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The null that the coefficient of Reputable Auditor equals to that of Reputable
Underwriter is rejected at the 10% level. The economic significance of the coefficient esti-
mate on reputable auditors is also stronger than that on reputable underwriters. Thus, these
results imply that reputable auditors play a relatively more important role in certifying the
quality of bond issues, consistent with the additional insurance role of reputable auditors
who provide effective legal protection for bondholders against potential losses arising from
fraud audits. The coefficient estimate of the interaction term of reputable auditor and
underwriter is not significant, implying that the effect of hiring a reputable auditor on
credit spreads does not vary with that of hiring reputable underwriters.
The signs of the coefficient estimates for the control variables are as expected: Higher
leverage is associated with higher credit spreads, reflecting greater credit risk. Issues with
put options or sinking fund features receive lower credit spreads, whereas callable or subor-
dinated bonds receive higher credit spreads. Speculative Grade is strongly positive and sig-
nificant, indicating that bondholders incorporate the risk assessments of credit-rating
agencies into their decision of risk premiums on bonds.
Models 3 and 4 show the results of the effects of reputable auditors and underwriters on
the maturities of bonds. In both models, the coefficient estimates on reputable auditors are
positive and significant, whereas those on reputable underwriters are positive but not signif-
icant. Specifically, in Model 4, the coefficient on Reputable Auditor indicates that hiring
reputable auditors on average lengthens bond maturities by 2.54 years. These results imply
that the monitoring role of reputable auditors substitutes for the ex-post monitoring role of
the short-term debt. Thus, issuers can issue bonds with longer maturities when they hire
reputable auditors.
Turning to bond size, in Models 5 and 6, we find that, in contrast to the maturity regres-
sion, the coefficient estimate on reputable underwriters is significantly positive, whereas
the estimate on reputable auditors is negative but not significant. The F test rejects the null
that the coefficient estimate on reputable underwriters equals to that on reputable auditors
at the 1% significance level. These results indicate that the role of reputable underwriters is
more valued in determining the issuing amounts of bonds, consistent with the extensive dis-
tribution networks and superior marketing and selling skills that reputable underwriters
have. The point estimate of 1.35 for the coefficient on the variable Reputable Underwriter
implies that hiring reputable underwriters on average increases the actual offering amount
by about 13.73%.
Taken together, the multivariate results from Table 4 demonstrate that reputable auditors
and underwriters have a significant impact on bonds’ pricing as well as nonpricing terms.
In the presence of reputable auditors, credit spreads are much lower, and bond maturities
are significantly longer; whereas with reputable underwriters, credit spreads are marginally
lower, and bond sizes are significantly larger. These results are consistent with the certifi-
cation hypothesis and the multiple roles that reputable auditors and underwriters play in the
bond market.
Sensitivity Analyses and Additional Tests
Self-Selection Bias
The previous literature suggests that the choices of auditors and underwriters may be sub-
jected to a selection bias (e.g., Chaney, Jeter, & Shivakumar, 2004; Fang, 2005). To the
extent that unobservable determinants of the auditors’ and underwriters’ choices correlate
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with bond terms, our coefficient estimates are biased and our inferences are confounded.
Hence, in this section, we address the selection-bias issue of reputable auditors and under-
writers and demonstrate that the inferences drawn from ordinary least squares [OLS]
regressions remain robust.
Endogenous Switching Model
We first use an endogenous switching model to address the selection-bias issue of reputable
auditors and underwriters (Maddala, 1983). Conceptually, we want to hold the bond issue
constant and keep separate the treatment effects on bond terms due to reputable auditors
and underwriters. More specifically, we are interested in the following counterfactual out-
comes: For an issue certified by a reputable auditor or underwriter, what would the alterna-
tive credit spread, maturity, and bond size be had it been certified by an ordinary auditor or
underwriter? Empirically, the endogenous switching model gives us a way to determine
these hypothetical outcomes. The model consists of a regression of the choice of reputable
auditors or underwriters and two outcome equations on the dependent variables of
interest—one for issues with reputable auditors/underwriters, and one for issues with ordi-
nary auditors/underwriters:
Reputable Auditor or Underwriteri 5 Z
0
i g1ei ð4Þ
y1i5x
0
i b11u1i ð5Þ
y2i 5 x
0
i b21u2i ð6Þ
The vector Zi contains the factors that affect the issuer’s choice of reputable auditors or
underwriters. We include firm-level variables such as leverage, size, tangibility, and ROA
in this vector. We also add two nonlinear terms in Zi, the squares of leverage and firm size,
because we expect that the choice of a reputable underwriter or auditor to be nonmono-
tonic. Larger and more indebted firms are more likely to choose reputable information
intermediaries because of their increased complexity.14 The endogeneity is then modeled
by allowing the error term in the regression of the auditor/underwriter choice to correlate
with the error terms in the outcome equations (i.e., Regressions 5 and 6, where the depen-
dent variables are the bond yields, maturities, or sizes). In this way, the unobserved factors
that affect the choice of reputable auditors or underwriters are also allowed to influence
bond terms.
In addition to addressing the endogeneity concern, the switching regression also relaxes
the restriction that the estimates of the b parameters are identical for issues with reputable
auditors/underwriters and those with ordinary auditors/underwriters. By estimating the coef-
ficients of variables in the vector X separately, the model provides the estimates needed to
calculate the hypothetical outcomes of bond terms.
Table 5 presents the results of the endogenous switching regressions. Panel A shows
that reputable auditors are more likely to certify smaller issuers with lower leverage and
larger tangible assets. We also include Reputable Underwriter as a control variable because
Balvers et al. (1988) suggest that the underwriter influences the auditor choice. Reputable
underwriters may more frequently select reputable auditors as a reflection of their high rep-
utation. Consistent with this argument, Panel A of Table 5 shows that the presence of
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reputable auditors is positively and significantly associated with the presence of reputable
underwriters.
Table 5, Panel B displays the results of the outcome equations. Although most variables
have the same sign in both equations corresponding to credit spreads, maturities, and bond
sizes, their magnitudes are notably different for bonds issued by firms hiring reputable and
ordinary auditors. This supports the relaxation of the assumption that the coefficient esti-
mates of explanatory variables are identical across the two alternative regimes (Reputable
Auditor = 1 vs. Reputable Auditor = 0). Furthermore, in the outcome regressions of credit
spreads, reputable underwriters appear to exert a negative effect only in the equation of
issues with ordinary auditors (Reputable Auditor = 0). This result suggests that, after con-
trolling for the selection of reputable auditors, there is an interaction effect between reputa-
ble auditors and reputable underwriters; namely, reputable underwriters play the
certification role in the absence of reputable auditors.
The separate estimations of bond terms across issues with reputable auditors and those
without show that the effects of the control variables on bond terms vary with the presence/
absence of reputable auditors. More importantly, such estimation techniques also enable us
to calculate the hypothetical outcomes of bond terms in alternative regimes. We do so by
applying the coefficient estimates of the regime of reputable auditors to issues with ordi-
nary auditors, and vice versa. Panel B of Table 5 compares the means of the actual values
of bond terms with their hypothetical counterparts, derived from the switching models. For
issues certified by reputable auditors (Group 1), the actual credit spread and maturity are
118 bps and 11.94 years, respectively. If certified by ordinary auditors, the hypothetical
spread and maturity would be 192 bps and 8.42 years, 74 bps more and 3.52 years shorter
than the actual case, these differences being statistically significant.
In contrast, the average issue with ordinary auditors (Group 2) has a credit spread of
134 bps and a maturity of 7.91 years. If certified by reputable auditors, the credit spread
would decrease by 23 bps, and the maturity would lengthen by 1.90 years. Again, the dif-
ferences between these actual and hypothetical values are statistically significant. In the
case of issues with ordinary auditors, their average bond size would have been larger, as
well.
We apply the endogenous switching model again to account for the self-selection bias of
reputable underwriters. We also calculate the differences in bond terms across the regimes
of reputable and ordinary underwriters. Panel C of Table 5 presents these results. For issues
certified by reputable underwriters, the actual credit spread and maturity are 178 bps and
12.06 years, respectively. If certified by ordinary underwriters, the hypothetical spread
would increase by 10 bps and the bond maturity would decrease by 1.78 years. For issues
placed by ordinary underwriters, the actual credit spread and bond maturity are 125 bps
and 8.72 years, respectively. Consistent with the main results, we also find that the bond
size decreases by approximately 17.39% relative to the average offering amount in our
sample (computed as 1.71 divided by 9.83). If placed by reputable underwriters, their
spread would be 13 bps less, their maturities would be 3.79 years longer, and their size
would increase by 24.72% relative to the average offering amount. This evidence shows
that, after controlling for the self-selection bias of reputable underwriters, the presence of
reputable underwriters can help issuers obtain favorable credit spreads, bond maturities,
and offering amounts. In particular, the substitution effect between hiring reputable under-
writers and the monitoring role of short-term debt turns out to be significant.
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Overall, these sensitivity tests document that the positive impacts of reputable auditors
and underwriters on bond terms shown in our main OLS regressions are robust after con-
trolling for selection-bias problems.
Changes Analysis
We use a change specification of our regressions to further address the selection-bias issues
regarding both reputable auditors and underwriters. This change approach can eliminate
firm-level unobserved factors that could potentially confound our results and that allows us
to establish a stronger causal link between the types of the two intermediaries and the bond
terms of interest.
Panel A of Table 6 presents descriptive statistics of the changes in bond terms caused
by changes of reputable auditors and underwriters, respectively. Columns (1) and (2) report
the statistics concerning the changes in credit spreads, maturities, and bond sizes after issu-
ing firms switch from ordinary auditors to reputable auditors, and vice versa. Among the
issuing firms that change to reputable auditors from ordinary ones, 52.5% enjoy a decrease
in credit spreads, 40% have longer bond maturities, and 50% issue larger bonds. This is
indicative that the new hires of reputable auditors have positive impacts on bond terms. In
contrast, when issuing firms dismiss reputable auditors, 60% of them have an increase in
their credit spreads and 45% of them experience a shortening in bond maturities. These sta-
tistics suggest that bondholders seem to punish issuers for switching from reputable audi-
tors to ordinary ones.
Columns (3) and (4) present descriptive statistics for the changes in bond terms due to
the changes from ordinary underwriters to reputable ones, and vice versa. For the issuing
firms that experience the changes from ordinary to reputable underwriters, 41% of them
have longer bond maturities and 52% of them increase bond sizes. The changes in the bond
terms concerning issuers’ switches from reputable to ordinary underwriters are not very
informative of any punishment by bond investors.
We then turn to the multivariate changes analysis to examine the effects of reputable
auditors and underwriters on the bond terms. In our OLS regressions, we do not exclude
the issuers that have multiple bonds in a given year. In the change regressions, however, to
make the changes comparable, we only include the largest bond of an issuer in a given
year. Furthermore, we also eliminate bonds in the year of changes of reputable auditors/
underwriters because it is unclear whether they were issued before or after the auditor/
underwriter changes. Finally, we halve the full-change sample as follows: The first sample
consists of issuing firms that switch from ordinary auditors to reputable auditors and those
that do not change auditors (DReputable Auditor = 1 or 0) and the second sample consists
of issuing firms that change from reputable auditors to ordinary auditors and those that do
not change auditors (DReputable Auditor = 21 or 0). Both samples use issuing firms that
do not change auditors as the comparison group.15 Such separation allows us to determine
whether the univariate evidence in Panel A holds in the multivariate framework. We
include the change in reputable underwriters in both regressions.
Panel B of Table 6 presents the multivariate regression results for the first sample.
Interestingly, the coefficient estimate of D Reputable Auditor in the regression of credit
spread is negative, but not statistically significant, implying that bondholders do not react
to switches from ordinary to reputable auditors strongly, although this might also be due to
the limited power because we do not have many reputable auditor switches in the sample.
Panel C of Table 6 displays the multivariate regression results for the second sample. The
coefficient estimate of D Reputable Auditor with respect to credit spread is negative and
statistically significant at 10%, indicating that the change from reputable auditors to
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ordinary auditors leads to an increase in credit spread. This is consistent with the univariate
evidence presented in Panel A, suggesting that bondholders penalize issuing firms that
switch from reputable to ordinary auditors. The coefficient estimate of D Reputable Auditor
on bond maturities is positive but not significant, weakly supporting the hypothesis that the
presence of reputable auditors and the effect of short-term bonds substitute for each other.
In both samples, we do not find any effect for the change in reputable underwriters, mainly
because they hardly change when auditors change.
The results in Panel B and C of Table 6 can be explained by bonds’ nonlinear payoff
structure (Easton, Monahan, & Vasvari, 2009). As holding bonds provides a limited
upside, bondholders are less sensitive to good news compared with bad news. This is
consistent with our multivariate results that bondholders do not react strongly to switches
from ordinary to reputable auditors. However, when there is bad news (i.e., issuing
firms change from reputable to ordinary auditors), bondholders react negatively and sig-
nificantly. Overall, these results largely support our conclusions from the OLS
regressions.
We also conduct a multivariate change analysis using samples partitioned based on
whether issuing firms change from ordinary underwriters to reputable underwriters, or vice
versa. Consistent with the univariate evidence, we do not find informative results for the
impact of changes in reputable underwriters on different bond terms. This may be due to
the low power of the test given that only a very small number of firms switch underwriters.
However, this result is also consistent with our argument that investors place more value
on reputable auditors than underwriters because the former play multiple roles as informa-
tion intermediaries, monitors, and insurance providers. Consequently, investors respond
more strongly to the changes in reputable auditors than underwriters.
Rating Groups Analysis
The theory suggests that the certification roles of reputable auditors and underwriters help
issuers reduce the information asymmetry that exists between insiders and bondholders.
Such an information gap could negatively affect bondholders if insiders use it to their own
advantage by diverting wealth to themselves. As a result, one would expect the impact of
intermediaries’ certification roles to increase in the magnitude of bond risk associated with
this information gap. Empirically, we use credit ratings to proxy for bond risk and explore
whether the effects of reputable auditors and underwriters are stronger for issues with
lower credit ratings. To do so, we partition the full sample into high-investment grade
(S&P’s rating ‘‘AAA,’’ ‘‘AA1,’’ and ‘‘AA’’), moderate-investment grade (‘‘AA2,’’
‘‘A1,’’ and ‘‘A’’), low-investment grade (‘‘A2,’’ ‘‘BBB1,’’ and ‘‘BBB’’), and specula-
tive grade (below ‘‘BBB’’).
Table 7 presents the results concerning the effects of reputable auditors and reputable
underwriters on the bond terms for different rating groups. Consistent with our expectation,
the coefficient estimates of reputable auditors on credit spreads become more negative as
ratings become lower. The estimates are especially significant and strong for issues with
low-investment and speculative grades, implying that the certification role of reputable
auditors is more important to the issues with a high bond risk. However, the coefficient
estimates of reputable auditors on bond maturities are only statistically significant for
issues with high-investment grades, suggesting that reputable auditors can only substitute
the ex-postmonitoring role of short-term debt in a low-bond-risk environment. The impact
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of reputable underwriters on bond sizes persists across rating groups, as the coefficient esti-
mates on reputable underwriters are positive and significant in all regressions of rating
groups.
Additional Robustness Checks
In untabulated robustness checks, we investigate whether our baseline results remain robust
when we use alternative measures of reputable auditors and underwriters. The first set of
robustness checks relates to alternative measures of reputable auditors. We designate an
auditor as a reputable auditor if its market share is the largest in the industry and exceeds
the rest of auditors by at least 15% instead of 10%. As an alternative, we follow prior liter-
ature (e.g., Mayhew & Wilkins, 2003) and construct a measure of auditor reputation based
on the square root of the assets of the auditor’s clients. Finally, we use an alternative indus-
try classification developed by Fama and French (1997) to identify reputable auditors. Our
main results are robust to all these measures.
In the second set of sensitivity checks, we find that our results are robust to alternative
specifications for the construct that captures the reputation of underwriters. We define repu-
table underwriters as the top eight underwriters based on market share. We also identify
the top five underwriters based on the logarithm of the face value of bond issues they have
advised on, as opposed to their market share. Our baseline findings regarding the size of
the bond issue continue to remain robust.
Conclusion
In this article, we test the certification hypothesis, which states that capital market interme-
diaries with reputation capital at stake can provide a certification role that reduces the
information asymmetry between firms and investors, and thereby helps firms obtain favor-
able bond terms. For this certification role to hold, capital market intermediaries must have
strong incentives to maintain their reputation through repeated entries into the capital
markets.
We empirically show that reputable auditors and underwriters indeed satisfy this require-
ment and play an important role in bridging firms that need to raise bonds and investors
that seek bond risk premiums. Reputable auditors and underwriters not only assist bond
issuers in obtaining lower bond yields but also help issuers borrow more and for longer
periods. Taken together, our results provide a more complete picture of how different capi-
tal market intermediaries affect the pricing and nonpricing terms of bonds. Furthermore,
the nature of reputable auditors’ and underwriters’ job responsibilities determines the dif-
ferent magnitudes and ways in which they provide benefits for the issuing firms.
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Appendix A Variable Definitions
Variable Definition Source
Reputable Auditor Indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm hires
reputable auditor, and 0 otherwise
Compustat
Tenure The length of the auditor–client relationship Compustat
Leverage Long-term debt divided by total asset Compustat
Tangibility Net property, plant, and equipment scaled by
total assets
Compustat
ROA Operating income divided by total assets Compustat
Firm Size The natural logarithm of total assets Compustat
Reputable Underwriter Indicator variable equal to 1 if an issue is
underwritten by a reputable underwriter,
and 0 otherwise
FISD
Credit Spread The difference between a bond issue’s
offering yield and the yield of a benchmark
treasury issue
FISD
Credit Rating Numeric values assigned to bond ratings
offered by S&P’s or Moody’s, ranging from 1
to 20
FISD
Speculative Grade Indicator variable equal to 1 if an issue is
rated below BBB by S&P’s or Moody’s, and
0 otherwise
FISD
Maturity An issue’s maturity date minus its offering
date in years
FISD
Bond Size The natural logarithm of an issue’s offering
amount
FISD
Callable Indicator variable equal to 1 if an issue has a
call option, and 0 otherwise
FISD
Putable Indicator variable equal to 1 if an issue has a
put option, and 0 otherwise
FISD
Sinking Fund Indicator variable equal to 1 if an issue has
the sinking fund feature, and 0 otherwise
FISD
Subordinated Indicator variable equal to 1 if an issue is
subordinated, and 0 otherwise
FISD
No. of Covenants The number of covenants included in an issue FISD
Note: BBB = Better Business Bureau; S&P = Standard & Poor’s; ROA = return on assets; FISD = Fixed Income
Securities Database.
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Appendix B Reputable Auditors by Industry
Two-digit SIC Reputable Auditors
13 PWC (1995-2006)
15 Arthur Anderson (1995-1998); Ernst and Young (1999-2006)
17 Arthur Anderson (1995-2006)
20 Ernst and Young (1995-2006)
22 Ernst and Young (1995-2006)
23 Ernst and Young (1995-2005); Deloitte and Touche (2006)
24 Arthur Anderson (1995-2004); KPMG (2005-2006)
25 PWC (1995-2006)
26 Arthur Anderson (1995-2001); PWC (2002-2006)
28 PWC (1995-2006)
29 PWC (1995-2006)
30 PWC (1995-2006)
31 Ernst and Young (1995-2006)
33 PWC (1995-2006)
34 PWC (1995-2006)
35 PWC (1995-2006)
36 KPMG (1995-2006)
37 Deloitte and Touche (1995-2000); PWC (2002-2006)
38 PWC (1995-2006)
39 PWC (1995-2006)
40 PWC (1995-2006)
42 Ernst and Young (1995-2005); Deloitte and Touche (2006)
44 PWC (1995-2006)
45 Ernst and Young (1995-2006)
48 PWC (1995-2000); Ernst and Young (2001-2006)
49 Arthur Anderson (1995-2000); Deloitte and Touche (2001-2006)
50 Deloitte and Touche (1995-2006)
51 Arthur Anderson (1995-2001); Ernst and Young (2002-2006)
53 Ernst and Young (1995-2006)
54 Deloitte and Touche (1995-2006)
55 Arthur Anderson (1995-2001); Deloitte and Touche (2002-2006)
56 Deloitte and Touche (1995-2006)
61 KPMG (1995-2006)
62 Deloitte and Touche (1995-2006)
63 PWC (1995-2006)
67 Ernst and Young (1995-2006)
70 Arthur Anderson (1995-2001); Ernst and Young (2002-2006)
72 PWC (1995-2006)
73 PWC (1995-2006)
75 KPMG (1995-2006)
78 Ernst and Young (1995-2006)
79 Arthur Anderson (1995-2001); Deloitte and Touche (2002-2006)
80 Ernst and Young (1995-2006)
87 PWC (1995-2006)
Note: SIC = Standard Industry Classification.
Obtained from Compustat.
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Notes
1. Bessembinder and Maxwell (2008) provide statistics that U.S. firms issued US$4.6 trillion in cor-
porate bonds during the period 1997-2006, which is approximately 3 times more than the amount
of equity issued over the same period.
2. In the wake of the Arthur Andersen scandal, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act passed in 2002 effectively
made auditors more accountable for errors under a structure of expanded duties and heightened
scrutiny.
3. Research by De Franco, Vasvari, and Wittenberg-Moerman (2009) documents that research cov-
erage by sell-side bond analysts working for underwriters is very limited.
4. Covenants are also important contractual features that deal with agency costs. Although the
Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD) provides data on the presence of covenants, it
does not document the details of covenants. To the extent that only the details of covenants can
capture their true restrictiveness, we do not examine the impact of reputable auditors and under-
writers on covenant strictness in this article. We do, however, use the number of covenants as a
control variable in our tests.
Appendix C Reputable Underwriters by Year
Year Reputable Underwriter
1996 JP Morgan, Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse, Citi, and Barclays Capital
1997 JP Morgan, Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Citi, Credit Suisse, and Morgan Stanley
1998 Bank of America Merrill Lynch, JP Morgan, Credit Suisse, Citi, and Morgan Stanley
1999 JP Morgan, Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse, Citi, and Barclays Capital
2000 JP Morgan, Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Citi, Credit Suisse, and Morgan Stanley
2001 JP Morgan, Citi, Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse, and Barclays Capital
2002 JP Morgan, Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Citi, Barclays Capital, and Credit Suisse
2003 JP Morgan, Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Citi, Barclays Capital, and Morgan Stanley
2004 JP Morgan, Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Citi, Barclays Capital, and Morgan Stanley
2005 JP Morgan, Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Barclays Capital, Citi, and Credit Suisse
2006 JP Morgan, Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Barclays Capital, Citi, and Goldman Sachs & Co
Note: SIC = Obtained from Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD).
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5. For example, Pittman and Fortin (2004) look at the role of Big Auditors in reducing the interest
rate for firms that have become public. Mansi et al. (2004) examine the influence of Big
Auditors and auditors’ tenure on credit spreads and find that auditor quality and tenure are nega-
tively and significantly related to credit spreads. In addition, Ahmed et al. (2008) study the
impact of industry audit specialists on credit ratings.
6. In 2002, Arthur Andersen was convicted of obstruction of justice for providing faulty audits of
Enron. As a result, the accounting firm paid US$ 72.5 million to Enron investors as compensa-
tion and ultimately surrendered its licenses and was no longer able to practice as Certified Public
Accountants in the United States.
7. Academic researchers use various industry classifications to divide firms into homogeneous
groups for the purpose of their analyses (e.g., Bhojraj, Charles, Lee, & Oler, 2003). Although not
all industry groupings suit our analysis, we also use a well-accepted alternative industry classifi-
cation developed by Fama and French (1997) in robustness checks (see section titled
‘‘Sensitivity Analyses and Additional Tests’’).
8. We use the Accounting and Governance Risk (AGR) rating provided by Audit Integrity in our
validity test. The AGR rating is a comprehensive measure of the risk associated with a public
firm’s accounting and governance practices. High AGR scores imply low accounting and govern-
ance risks. In unreported tables, we show that the presence of industry audit specialists is associ-
ated with a low AGR score, consistent with the notion that industry audit specialists are related
to high accounting and governance quality.
9. A potential explanation for this finding is that bank relationships in the loan market provide the
underwriters an informational advantage in the bond market.
10. Market share has been used frequently in the finance literature as an empirical proxy for reputa-
tion. See, for example, Simon (1990), De Long (1991), Megginson and Weiss (1991), and Beatty
and Welch (1996).
11. Examples of expenses associated with debt issuance are underwriting fees, advertising costs, and
brokerage cost. Moreover, besides amortization of expenses associated with debt issuance, there
are also other items included in the interest expense filed from Compustat that have nothing to
do with the cost of debt, such as interest expense associated with deferred compensation and tax
settlements, factoring charges, and so on.
12. Appendix B lists the names of reputable auditors by industry.
13. For example, if a bond issue has a rating of AAA by Moody’s or S&P’s, the value of the vari-
able Credit Rating is 1, whereas if a bond issue is rated BAA, its value is 9. The earliest rating
for a bond issue is taken whenever available in the Mergent FISD; if not, the second most recent
rating or the average rating of the issue is used instead.
14. According to Li and Prabhala (2007), this type of selection model does not strictly require exo-
genous instruments. Nevertheless, we also estimate the first stage models by using two instru-
ments, the percentage of firms in an industry that hire a reputable auditor or underwriter and the
results remain very robust. Minnis (2011) provides a discussion about the appropriateness of
such instruments computed at the industry level.
15. We thank the referee for suggesting this research design.
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